报告题目：Information Sharing in an Online Marketplace with Co-opetitive Sellers

报告时间：2021年5月20日（周四）上午10:30--12:00

报告地点：腾讯会议 ID：828 898 841（会议密码：0520）

报 告 人：李果  北京理工大学管理与经济学院 教授

主办单位：经济管理学院

报告人简介：

  李果：北京理工大学管理与经济学院教授，博士生导师，管理科学与物流系主任，长期从事绿色供应链与物流管理、市场营销与运营交叉学科、大数据驱动的决策管理等领域的教学研究工作，担任中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会智能决策与博弈分会常务理事、工业工程分会理事和中国自动化学会经济与管理系统专业委员会委员，中国物流学会理事和特约研究员，中国技术经济学会复杂科学管理分会理事，国际知名期刊Information Technology & People (SSCI, ABS-3)高级编辑，Production and Operations Management (UTD24/FT50)编委，Decision Sciences（DSI会刊）编委，International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications (SSCI) 顾问编委，中国工程院院刊Frontier of Engineering Management特约通讯专家，《计算机集成制造系统》(CIMS)期刊理事，International Journal of Advanced Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing副主编，国际知名期刊Transportation Research Part E、Annals of Operations Research、International Journal of Production Research、Journal of Business Research和International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications客座编辑，长期担任Production and Operations Management、Decision Sciences、IISE Transactions、European Journal of Operational Research等30余个SCI/SSCI期刊审稿人，以第一/通讯作者在顶级/重要期刊Journal of Operations Management (UTD24/FT50)、Production and Operations Management (UTD24/FT50)、Decision Sciences、Naval Research Logistics、European Journal of Operational Research、IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management、IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics、中国管理科学、管理工程学报和电子科技大学学报（社科版）等上发表论文60余篇。2020年获Structural Change and Economic Dynamics期刊首届最佳论文奖，中国工程院院刊Frontier of Engineering Management 2020年杰出通讯专家奖，第十九次中国物流学术年会优秀论文奖一等奖，第三届北京市大学生物流设计大赛优秀指导教师奖。

报告摘要：

  In recent years, the rapid development of online marketplaces has given rise not only to co-opetitive relationships between sellers but also to information asymmetries between online marketplaces and sellers. This paper studies information sharing in an e-commerce setting consisting of an online marketplace, an upstream manufacturer and a reseller, where the online marketplace possesses superior demand information, while the manufacturer and reseller engage in a co-opetitive structure. The reseller procures products from the manufacturer under a wholesale price contract, and both the manufacturer and reseller sell the products through the online marketplace by paying a proportional commission fee. We examine four information-sharing scenarios: no information sharing (S1), full information sharing (S2), information sharing only with the manufacturer (S3) and information sharing only with the reseller (S4). Our analysis shows that when the intensity of competition between the manufacturer and reseller is relatively low and demand variability is moderate, the online marketplace prefers full information sharing; otherwise, it prefers to share its demand information only with the manufacturer. Moreover, interestingly, we find that the manufacturer always prefers the scenario with full information sharing to the scenario that endows her with an informational advantage over the reseller. In contrast, depending on the competitive intensity and demand variability, the reseller prefers either the scenario in which the online marketplace shares demand information with him only or that in which demand information is shared with the manufacturer only.